By Lia Goldman
The Russian invasion of Ukraine, Chinese military activities in the South-Pacific, and North Korean and Iranian threats underscore the importance of maintaining advanced military capabilities, foreign basing, and effective intelligence. Despite the end of American unipolarity - the US is no longer the sole superpower - it remains the most influential state in the world. Its innovation sector, geographic location, and size present unique strategic advantages. More importantly, America remains the world's largest economy with a GDP of $23315.08 billion in 2022, and leading military power with a current defense budget of $136.7 billion. As one of the veto powers in the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the largest single contributor to UN peacekeeping and its regular budget, the US is in a unique position to influence the global agenda. It is also the main contributor and largest voting bloc at the IMF, and the only shareholder at the World Bank with veto power over structural changes. But US foreign policy does not take place in a vacuum. Structural constraints, like the distribution of power in the international system (Waltz 1979) and international norms and institutions (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) limit the spectrum of governments' behavior. The WTO for example regularly and assertively pushes back against US tariff policies. What is more, globalization and the digital revolution make cooperation indispensable. States that want to attract cooperation and persuade foreign partners in today’s interconnected, interdependent world need soft power.
So what is soft power in foreign policy? Joseph Nye, the political scientist who invented the term in 1990, defines it as the power to persuade other states. States can exercize soft power through culture, the attractiveness of their values, and the legitimacy and consistency of government policies; it is derived from attraction and emulation. In contrast, hard power is all about coercion; executed through military threats and economic incentives and based on tangible resources such as the army or economic strength. In a world of diffuse power and transnational challenges, soft power promises more endurance and sustainability than hard power. The global challenges of the 21st Century - climate change, transnational terrorism, global diseases, and cyber threats - have one thing in common. They cannot be solved by a single actor. Let’s look at two examples: Addressing major health challenges will require continued aid to institutions such as the WTO, and investments in increasingly relevant regional organizations, and the philanthropies, and private companies that play a key role in addressing global diseases (Jha 2021). To tackle cybercrime, the Biden administration needs to advance American interests and values by strengthening the tech innovation ecosystem and pushing for the rule of law and greater security through multilateral frameworks (Williams 2020). For this, Washington needs to be seen as a trustworthy global player. There is also a domestic incentive for investing in soft power: 64% of Millennials and Zoomers favor economic and diplomatic efforts over military action to solve conflicts abroad (Pew Research, 2020). Millennials also overwhelmingly believe the US should accommodate the interests of other states (63% vs. 44% of respondents from the Silent Generation). Millennials and Zoomers remember the endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan a lack of accountability for the policies that had disastrous, unforeseen (but not necessarily unforeseeable) consequences. Both generations were also brought up with global interconnection and interdependence. It's not surprising that voters from these generations display higher support for soft power mechanisms when it comes to foreign policy. Washington should be attentive to its citizens' opinions on foreign policy, (including and in particular shifting policy priorities among younger factions of its electorate) to design policies that reflect the preferences of America’s future.
Alas, soft power diplomacy is not the solution to all crises. One of its limitations is time; attracting cooperation and building trust takes time that the fast-paced nature of global conflicts generally doesn’t permit. In addition to this, the agenda-setting benefits of soft power generally occur long after the politicians who initiated a particular policy or diplomatic relationship have left office. This reduces the electoral incentives for politicians to invest in soft power. And some states and non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, simply don’t respond to soft power strategies. It is therefore an illusion that soft power alone can produce an effective foreign policy, as Nye concludes (2009). Although soft and hard power are oppositional approaches, the key to an effective foreign policy in the 21st Century is to combine them. Let’s take the example of counterterrorism. Drawing lessons from Afghanistan, Azizian (2021) finds that partnerships with host nations allow for a more efficient allocation of analytical and operational resources. Combining soft and hard power also includes close cooperation with host nations to identify terrorist leaders in the state and greater region and build trust with states in the region. If it a legitimate and trustworthy partner, the US can assist host nations in acquiring intelligence and security capabilities and training locals. It can profit from intelligence sharing, utilise regional expertise and help to build local resilience. A combination of soft and hard power, therefore, facilitates the detection of emerging terrorist groups.
It also avoids the costs of unilateral hard power. Coercive strategies may deliver immediate results, but the gains are often of short duration. The Iraq war disrupted the regional balance of power and increased sectarian violence. It also reinforced the strength of hard-liners in Tehran, and increased terrorists' operational capabilities and their appeal by aggravating grievances against the US and the West. This facilitated recruitment for terrorist groups. The Bush administration, therefore, failed to achieve its initial goal by using hard power; it ultimately strengthened transnational terrorism and undermined worldwide confidence in US leadership on human rights issues and other global causes. This is just one example of how hard power can undercut soft power. Used effectively, hard power strategies can reinforce soft power. A delicate balancing act is therefore required; with particular attention to legitimacy. Even Henry Kissinger conceives that the international order not only depends on the balance of power but also on perceptions of legitimacy. The Biden administration needs to pay careful attention to the legitimacy of America’s economic, military and diplomatic enterprises.
Attraction and persuasion have the tendency to cause long-term change in diplomacy. Restraint in the use of force, and judicious attention to international law will allow Washington to use the full range of foreign policy tools that can influence states’ behavior through attraction. For example, work on climate has the potential of greatly enhance America’s soft power. Biden’s active role in COP27 and appointment of a “climate envoy” to the NSC are a success (White House 2022). So are foreign aid policies, such as the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief among other humanitarian assistance.
The US can also capitalize on other qualities that make it attractive. This includes its appeal as a diverse nation, and domestic soft power generators, such as the entertainment and music industry. America’s soft and smart power was weakened by President Trump’s hyper-nationalist rhetoric and withdrawal of the Paris Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade pact, and his weakening of the WTO and NAFTA among others. The Biden administration must continue to strengthen partnerships and multilateral alliances to make up for these losses. President Biden is generally on the right track to doing so: Numerous of his foreign policies, like creating AUKUS to balance against China and coordinating with NATO members to assist Ukraine, combine soft and hard power. Finally, becoming a smart power heavyweight requires abandoning nativist strands of American exceptionalism. The days when unilateralism could promise national security are over. Instead, the US should advance its security interests by leading in the production of global public goods and embrace a vision of its role in the world that is based on cooperative leadership.
References
Azizian, N., (2021). Easier to get into War than to get out: The Case of Afghanistan, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Harvard Kennedy School.
Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization, 52(4), pp. 887-917.
Jha, A. (2021). System failure: America needs a Global Health Policy for the Pandemic Age. Foreign Affairs, 100, 103.
Nye, J. S., (2009). Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power. Foreign Affairs, 88(4), pp. 160–163.
Waltz, K. (1979), Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House.
White House., (2022). Fact sheet: President Biden's leadership to tackle the climate crisis at home and abroad, The White House. The United States Government.
Williams, R.D. (2020) “Crafting a multilateral technology and cybersecurity policy,” Brookings, pp. 1–8.
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