If You Sell Out Ukraine, You Sell Out the Future

By Joseph Farrell

Editor: Eleonore Huez

The opinions expressed in this article reflect the opinions of its author(s). They do not represent the views of the UCL International Relations Society, Circum Mundum, or its Editorial Team.

Over three years ago, Putin launched his crusade of revanchism to completely overthrow a democratically elected Ukrainian government, challenging the sovereignty of Ukraine. Back in 2014, during the invasion of Crimea, Putin’s imperialist scheme was uncovered. After subsuming the Crimean Peninsula in a botched referendum and effectively controlling the Eastern region of Donbas through Russian separatists, the war was extended with the outright invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces in February 2022.

Reaching areas only 25 kilometres away from Kyiv within a few weeks of the invasion, Russian forces were immeasurably close to overthrowing Zelensky’s government. Since the Ukrainian counter-offensive stabilised frontlines, the areas of Ukraine under Russian control have consistently hovered around 20 percent. In this context, many underestimate Putin and mistake his determination to create a ‘neutral’ Ukraine for non-interference in Ukrainian sovereignty pending a peace deal. In this complicated web of actors, the European Union (EU) and the United States have served as a limited brake on Putin’s ambitions yet have enforced similar impediments pertaining to military capabilities on Ukraine. This underscores that the domestic political environments of Europe and the U.S. preclude any greater aid that is required by Ukraine to turn the tide in this war. The Ukrainians have merely been supplemented by the Europeans and Americans.

Amidst all of this, and during recent negotiations, Putin’s intransigence to a sovereign Ukraine is clearly on show. It was not, as suggested by some, NATO’s eastern expansion in the post-cold war era that incensed the Kremlin, but rather the orientation of Ukraine towards the West. This has been growing in recent years, especially after the overthrow of pro-Kremlin Ukraine president Yanukovych, precipitated by his refusal to sign a free trade agreement with the EU due to heavy Russian influence. While giving a speech in 2024, Putin affirmed that ‘Ukraine should adopt a neutral, nonaligned status, be nuclear-free, and undergo demilitarisation and denazification’. While this may seem on offer for ‘peace’ and an end to the war, it is unlikely to deter Russia from invading again. If Ukraine is constrained in its military capabilities after a peace agreement, how may functional peace flourish when there is no total confidence in the future of Ukraine as a sovereign state? 

By cutting a deal in haste, the Trump administration will no doubt set a severely weakened Ukraine on a path to economic ruin, societal fragmentation, and little reprieve for the citizens of Ukraine from the threat of Putin. On the other hand, a peace agreement would have to be pragmatic and cognisant of current realities, meaning Ukrainian land under Russian occupation would, most likely, be annexed. This would not necessarily mean an appeasement of blatant aggression; not if Ukraine is provided with concrete security proposals. Though agonisingly difficult to concede land taken in this illicit nature, such a price for peace should not be zero-sum for Ukraine, who in my opinion should be endowed with a strong military as assurance and deterrence. This is only achievable through significant aid from the EU. However, they cannot provide a separate force to act as peacekeepers in Ukraine – by some estimates, only a force of 200,000 soldiers would suffice as deterrence, yet recent forecasts for a pan-European force total no more than 30,000. Thus, though European capabilities are inefficient to enforce such a peace, European military support would bolster the Ukrainian army during peacetime, being funded by the $300bn or so of frozen Russian assets. Therefore, along with a sustained Ukrainian army, a long-term security proposal by the EU is necessary to provide Ukraine with a future of peace.

A peace deal should also aim to envision an eventual de-escalation of military forces, as European capabilities improve via domestic industrial build-up thanks to increased defence spending as a share of GDP. This helps lessen the burden on Ukrainian forces thanks to incorporation of European support troops. Meanwhile, it is vital that Putin is checked; the only path to enduring peace lies in the deconstruction of his regime, and avenues such as the crippling sanctions on domestic markets, such as Oil and Banking, would inevitably erode his influence. Sanction removals should be contingent on certain requirements being met, such as diplomatic advancements between Russia and the West, as well as Russia acceding to demands for open, democratic elections to be held in Russian-administered Ukraine, to protect the self-determination of Ukrainians. Though this may well be a pipe dream, the fate of European societies hangs tenuously in the balance.

The line dividing European democracies from destruction and repression is dangerously minimal. The post-World War II institutions which protected peace and nourished unprecedented development in the region, and the globe, are near collapse. If Putin is willing to sacrifice  1,500 Russians a day (according to the Department of Defence), it is reasonable to state that this barbaric invasion would spread to all. If Trump really wishes to stop the ‘horrible, very bloody war’, as he comments, there must be no forgiveness when arriving to the negotiating table. The very fact that such forgiveness cost millions of lives in the pursuit of illusory ‘peace’ prior to World War II when the Allies appeased Hitler might serve as a reminder. If the United States seeks to do this, Europe must stand firm in the principles that have so far sustained support for Ukraine: a nation’s sovereignty and the freedoms this entails to the people of said nation.

Supporting Ukrainian positions in negotiations is a basic prerequisite to continue supporting these immutable principles and rights. Pragmatism is necessary too, to a certain extent, but the conviction to defend liberty is the only bulwark separating European states from Putin. We must keep them alive, not only for the sake of Ukraine and as justice to their people, but also to conserve the freedoms of our own lives that these principles have undoubtedly produced.