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The development of nuclear weapons have irrefutably shaped the international order. Despite their massive destructive capabilities, many have credited nuclear weapons with preventing the outbreak of another global war. This is due to superpowers adhering to a policy of nuclear deterrence – a strategy associated with pragmatic realism. Ostensibly, the acquisition of nuclear weapons has created a less violent international system in which the presence of WMDs prevents direct war between superpowers. Deterrence theory is contingent on the doctrine of mutually assured destruction, whereby the use of nuclear weapons by two opposing sides would mean total annihilation for both parties. Using the quintessential Cold War example, if the Soviet Union were to launch a nuclear missile at the United States, the US would respond with a nuclear strike of their own, leading to destruction on both sides. The result of such policy is – in theory – equilibrium, where neither side wants to launch nor disarm.
This realist, albeit cynical, view is one based on seemingly rational logic and shrewd reasoning rooted in realpolitik-style calculation, which serves as the primary justification for the possession and proliferation of nuclear weapons. Despite many leaders in the US and Europe vocally supporting disarmament, little has been done to transform rhetoric into action. NATO’s official policy remains effectively in favour of nuclear deterrence, stating that “as long as nuclear weapons exist, [NATO] will remain a nuclear alliance”, despite their professed support for disarmament. The United Kingdom, in line with this policy, justifies the maintaining of their nuclear capabilities by pointing to the expanding size of Russia’s nuclear arsenal; “to abandon our nuclear deterrent would put us all at greater risk”, states the UK’s policy brief.
On a surface level, deterrence appears to have worked; since the advent of nuclear weapons, a global war has been absent. Additionally, the number of conflict related deaths has, over the past few decades, been lower than any other period in human history. Upon critical examination, neither of these points indicate that nuclear deterrence will continue to be effective.
Firstly, there is no empirical way to show that nuclear weapons helped avert a Third World War. The US and Russia have had no history of fighting a war prior to the nuclear age. Likewise, there is no evidence which suggests that the Soviet Union attempted to conquer NATO-affiliated states, or undertake aggressive action which would provoke war between the superpowers. There is little to suggest that either side had any intention of making the cold war a hot one. The structure of the international system has changed dramatically whereby international institutions and economic globalisation have created overlapping diplomatic and economic interests between states. Even without nuclear weapons, there is little incentive for superpowers to engage in a direct war fought with conventional weapons. Per Richard Rosecrance’s analysis, industrialised countries benefit far more from economic development and foreign trade than conflict. It cannot be concluded that nuclear weapons resulted in the absence of a global war, simply because the former preceded the latter.
Many proponents of nuclear deterrence emphasise the decline in conflict-related deaths since the deployment of the first atomic bomb in 1945. While this is true, the number of deaths is not an indication that war has become less prevalent or that the level of violence has decreased. A declining number of combat-related fatalities can be attributed to considerable improvements in military medicine which has dramatically reduced the risk of death in combat zones, as demonstrated by Fazal and Poast’s analysis in Foreign Affairs. Meanwhile, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program shows that the number of active armed conflicts has been steadily increasing over the past two centuries, peaking and plateauing in 2016.
In addition, developments in conventional weapons have led to a shift towards asymmetric conflict between superpowers and weaker states. Here, nuclear weapons have been of little strategic use.
For instance, the US failed to win the war in Vietnam after decades of military involvement, despite wielding a massive advantage in nuclear and conventional capabilities. Recently, the US lost the war in Afghanistan, with the US-backed Afghan government rapidly collapsing as American forces withdrew from a two-decade occupation. Similarly, the Soviet Union, possessing the world’s largest nuclear arsenal at the time, were ousted from Afghanistan by guerilla Mujahideen forces. British nuclear weapons did little to intimidate Nasser’s Egypt during the Suez Crisis in 1956, the result of which was political humiliation for Britain and France. Again, British nuclear weapons did not deter Leopoldo Galtieri from invading the Falkland Islands in 1982. In 1991, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was undeterred from launching Scud missile attacks against a nuclear-armed Israel, who refrained from retaliating despite having the means to annihilate Baghdad with a nuclear strike.
Perhaps most important today is the example of India and Pakistan; tensions and the risk of war have increased over recent years, albeit with both parties now armed with nuclear weapons. India possesses around 150 nuclear warheads, with land, sea, and air-launch capabilities. Pakistan has 160 warheads as of 2020, and it is estimated that their arsenal could grow to 250 warheads by 2025. With India’s revocation of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, and constant border skirmishes along the Line of Control, tensions between these two nuclear powers show no signs of abating as both sides continue to expand their arsenals.
Furthermore, deterrence relies upon nuclear-armed states having arsenals which are invulnerable to attack, whereby the retaliatory capability of the potential victim remains operational to guarantee mutual destruction. However, as nuclear missiles become more accurate, there is a high potential for states to target their adversaries’ arsenals, eliminating their “second-strike” capabilities. This increases the likelihood of a state launching a first strike as a pre-emptive measure, fearing that their own nuclear weapons are vulnerable. Here, a precarious scenario emerges, with both sides perceiving an advantage to striking first.
Even if deterrence theory could, in fact, promote peace and security, it does not account for accidents, and potential acquisition by non-state actors. Since the September 11 attacks, terrorism has dominated conversations about international security. In this regard, deterrence theory is totally irrelevant, as terrorist attacks are more likely to be carried out with nuclear weapons than deterred by them. The more that nuclear weapons are manufactured, and the longer they remain in operation, the greater the risk of them being acquired by terrorist groups. Following the end of the bi-polar world order of the Cold War, an increasing number of states have acquired nuclear weapons, thereby increasing the risk of nuclear catastrophe, as new nuclear states lack the same rigorous safeguards to prevent nuclear accidents or unauthorised launches.
For this reason, former strong proponents of nuclear deterrence such as US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger – who, in 1956, promoted the tactical use of nuclear weapons as part of US foreign policy – argued that nuclear weapons pose greater risks than benefits within a multi-polar world order. Writing for the Wall Street Journal in 2007, alongside George P. Schultz and William J. Perry, Kissinger advocated for a world free of nuclear weapons, outlining a series of steps to facilitate disarmament.
The threats posed by nuclear weapons significantly outweigh their potential benefits. Though nuclear annihilation has been averted thus far, complacence is not an option as conflicts continue to emerge and intensify throughout the world. Even for states with nuclear capabilities, the practical incentives of development remain unclear, and are increasingly dwarfed by the risks of their acquisition by non-state actors. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation and relying on them for international security is hazardous and ineffective. With tensions rising between nuclear states, the future of peace through deterrence becomes increasingly uncertain and dangerously unstable. This makes non-proliferation and disarmament the most sensible course of action, and a world free of nuclear weapons is the only rational way to avert catastrophe.
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