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This is an opinion piece written by Joseph Mangin. Design by Rosie Phillips. The Latvian General Election was held on October 1st. Amid the invasion of Ukraine, the Post-Soviet country became, for a day, the front-line in the proxy war between Russia and Europe. As the ruling centre-right “New unity Party” collected the most votes and “Harmony” suffered an extraordinary decline, international observers were quick to announce the “Win for pro-Western over pro-Moscow parties” (Euronews, 2020).
Although the new parliament’s composition reflects a certain hostility to Putin’s aggression, I urge Europeans to hold a more reserved appreciation of the election’s results. The reasons to Latvia’s integration in the European Union suggest that the fall of the traditional Kremlin-friendly party may, contrary to general expectations, weaken the ties between Latvia and the EU.
A Transformation to Latvia’s Party System - The Fall of “Harmony”
Earlier this year,, the view that Harmony would fail to meet the necessary 5% threshold to enter parliament, was unconceivable. The Social Democratic Party traditionally served as an umbrella for the Russian-speaking population and thus benefited from a stable political base (ABC NEWS, 2022). In 2018, it attracted close to 20% of the votes, obtaining a relative majority in parliament (Politico, 2022). Then, only the dynamics of political coalitions could prevent Vjačeslavs Dombrovskis from leading the country (ABC NEWS, 2022).
The invasion of Ukraine marked the end of ‘Harmony’s’ monopoly over Russian-speaking voters. Ivars Zariņš, new leader of the party, failed to reconcile diverging views on Putin’s foreign policy. By condemning the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, Zarins caused hard-line Russia sympathisers to desert. Conversely, those opposed to the war were reluctant to endorse a party related to the Kremlin (VOA News, 2022). The polling data supports this analysis (Politico, 2022). While ahead in the polls prior to the 24th of February, ‘Harmony’ then suffered a steady decline; plunging to 4.8%. (Red line in figure 1).
New contenders
Who benefited from the collapse of Harmony? While international observers emphasized that a portion of the party’s base turned to the pro-European New Unity Party, this is not the whole picture. The 2022 general election has also seen the emergence and consolidation of parties characterised by a certain scepticism towards the European Union and, most concerningly, a populist rhetoric (Guillermo, 2022).
A notable example of this phenomenon is the success of the “Union of Green and Farmers”, which obtained the second most seats in Parliament. Thanks to his personal network among farm owners, Aivars Lembergs was able to project the image of being close to countryside workers. To the Latvian lower class, he opposed “Riga elites”; the latter portrayed as disconnected from the people (Guillermo, 2022). The party list “Latvian Association of Regions”, which arrived third in the general election and is likely to participate in the ruling coalition, used a similar political strategy.
Implications for the European Union
Looking at the motives and political dynamics underlying Latvia’s European project, it appears that the changes afore discussed may weaken the country’s European Integration.
Geopolitical considerations
There is a consensus that the European Union is the only serious instrument to break away from Russia’s orbit (Bukovskis, 2018). If it were not for EU membership, Latvia would likely resemble countries such as Belarus or Moldavia (Auers, 2020). The military conflict in Ukraine has undoubtedly given a new dimension to the security associated with European Integration. However, while the geopolitical context makes Latvia’s exit from the EU very unlikely (Petsinis, 2020), it does not constitute a safeguard against lower European integration. The EU member status, combined with NATO membership, are by themselves sufficient to guarantee Latvia’s sovereignty.
Economic considerations
A second pillar of Latvia’s European Integration is the widespread public belief that EU membership goes with economic prosperity. Since its accession in 2004, Latvia has received more than 10 billion euros from the EU budget and enjoys a favourable investment environment (Bukovskis, 2018). However, there is a certain discrepancy between this romantic perception and a darker reality. Indeed, Latvia’s economy has grown at a significantly lower rate than other Baltic states’( Eurostat,2022). In light of the country’s relatively poor economic condition, one can be sceptical of whether Latvians’ appreciation is actually shaped by economic factors (Auers, 2020). The positive sentiment towards European assimilation, including economic integration, is rather shaped by the country’s party system.
Latvia’s Party System
As previously mentioned, political competition has traditionally been structured by the ethnic cleavage between Latvians and Russian speakers (Bērziņa, 2019). This divide is particularly strong on the question of European integration, framed as an identity dilemma between the “prospering West and the backward East” (Eihmanis, 2019). Thus, ethnic Latvians, who constitute the great majority of the population, have been generally supportive of the European project. However, the party dynamics which characterised the 2022 general elections suggest that the ethnic divide has been replaced by a class cleavage. Populist parties such as the Union of Green and Farmers and the Latvian Association of Regions were able to attract voters from both communities (Guillermo, 2022).
This is concerning for Latvia’s relationship with the European Union for several reasons. First, the ethnic political divide limited Euroscepticism by overshadowing issues related to EU integration. Contracting the policy space, the cleavage reduced voters’ attention to problems such as the state of the economy or social security (Eihmanis, 2019). Moreover, the ruling elites were free to implement their desired policies as long as the alternatives to Latvia’s new liberalism were formulated by politically Russian parties (ibid). Nowadays, in the face of great inflation, it will certainly prove more difficult for the pro-European governing party to maintain public support (Jegelevicius, 2022).
Secondly, the Latvian European project is particularly vulnerable to populist rhetoric. Indeed, support for European integration has been significantly stronger among the governing elite than the general population (Eihmanis, 2019). This was all the more apparent during the 2004 referendum when the government engaged public money in a vote-yes campaign (Auers, 2020). This led scholars to state that this vote provided formal but no substantial legitimacy to EU accession (Pridham, 2007). Since then, deflating support for the EU has systematically been compensated by actions from the political elites (Eihmanis, 2019). The new populist tendency and the increase in the number of parliamentarians from civil society (Jegelevicius, 2022), will certainly limit this dynamic.
While the end of the cleavage between ethnic Latvians and Russians speakers may enhance Latvia’s democracy, it also entails that the country is now exposed to the same problem as other EU democracies: Populism and its fraternal twin Euroscepticism. Although the latter may be limited by the current geopolitical context in the short term, the new political landscape promises the end of the consensus on the benefits of European integration.
References
1. ABC NEWS (2022). Latvian premier’s party emerges on top in general election. [online] ABC News. 2. Auers, D. (2020). Latvia. The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe, [online] pp.131–150. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-40858-9_7. 3. Bērziņa, I. (2019). Latvia. Thirty Years of Political Campaigning in Central and Eastern Europe, [online] pp.49–64. 4. Bukovskis (2018). Latvia’s controlled discontents. [online] ECFR. Available at: https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_latvias_controlled_discontents/ 5. Eihmanis, E. (2019). Latvia and the European Union. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. [online] doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1039. 6. Euronews. (2022). Latvia’s election confirms decisive win for pro-Western over pro-Moscow parties. [online] Available at: https://www.euronews.com/2022/10/02/latvia-prime-ministers-new-unity-party-wins-general-election-early-results 7. Eurostat (2022). GDP per capita in PPS [online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tec00114/default/table?lang=en 8. Guillermo (2022). New Unity’s New Partners: Coalition Building After Latvia’s 2022 Elections - Foreign Policy Research Institute. [online] Foreign Policy Research Institute. Available at: https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/10/new-unitys-new-partners-coalition-building-after-latvias-2022-elections/ 9. Jegelevicius (2022). Latvia: Exit polls put PM’s New Unity party ahead in vote amid Ukraine war and soaring inflation [online] Available at: https://www.euronews.com/2022/09/30/latvia-holds-general-election-amid-ukraine-war-and-record-high-inflation 10. Petsinis, V. (2020). Geopolitics, Ethnopolitics and the EU: The Cases of Serbia and Latvia. 11. POLITICO. (2022). POLITICO Poll of Polls — Latvian polls, trends and election news for Latvia. [online] POLITICO. 12. Pridham (2007). Legitimating European Union Accession? Party Politics, [online] 13(5), pp.563–586. 13. VOA News (2022). Latvia’s General Election Tests Loyalties of Ethnic-Russian Voters. [online] VOA.
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