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This is an opinion piece written by Max Mihailovici. Graphic design by Rosie Phillips.
The 21st century sees increasing challenges mount against the post-Cold War global order led by the United States. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy has yet again shifted to Great Power confrontation. Despite increasing costs, and a bleak economic environment, the U.S. is heavily committed to this doctrine. In an increasingly challenging global security environment, the upkeeping of U.S. interests requires, once again, a shift from passive to active deterrence of Great Powers.
In U.S. history, this phenomenon is hardly new. Comparisons can be drawn to the late 1940s when the U.S. opted to cement its global standing over isolationism, or after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, with the adoption of the confrontationist ‘rollback’ policy over ‘détente’. The emergence of a revisionist block, led by the Great Powers of China and Russia, has escalated tensions to levels not seen since the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. This article explores the U.S.’ shift to the active assertion of its interests by comparing recent events to similar instances during the early Cold War, the end of détente, and post-Cold War environments.
The end of WWII signaled drastic changes in American foreign policy. Unlike the aftermath of WWI, the traditional ‘global policemen’ of Britain and France no longer possessed the strength to counter that of an emerging revisionist block, led by the Soviets. Furthermore, the U.S. was much more firmly militarily and politically committed; 1.6 million American troops were present in for Victory in Europe Day (VE Day), and 430,000 troops occupied Japan in 1945. It is against this backdrop that strategic initiatives like the Marshall Plan bore fruition. U.S. foreign policy adjusted to world politics out of necessity to uphold its interests in the face of a new contender. Isolationism lost relevance as a policy among both parties, even among isolationists such as Taft, out of realization that the costs of Europe and Asia dominated by the USSR would’ve been far greater than the costs of containing the spread of Soviet influence. Events such as the Bosphorus Straits crisis and the Berlin Blockade convinced the American people and policymakers alike of the necessity of halting aggressive challenges to the status quo by the Soviets. This reverberates with modern events such as China’s hostile policy in Taiwan, which deems it a rebellious, breakaway province, and therefore an internal matter. In an effort to assert dismissal of the One China Principle, the U.S. pivots towards the active deterrence of a Great Power; losing Taiwan would incur far greater a cost than deterring China. Just like the Soviet Union, China has made its intentions concerning the restructuring of the world order, clear by challenging the current U.S.-led order. And like the 1940s, this policy enjoys strong bipartisan and public support.
The 1970s were largely characterized by a period of thawing relations between the Soviet Union, and U.S. Under détente, America adopted a realist position where it recognized that pushing back against communism, given the difficult economic and political realities of the time, was costlier than co-existing with it. This however ended after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which brought about bipartisan support for re-instating the policy of ‘rollback’. Defense spending tripled from 1979 to 1986, and politically, the U.S. switched to aggressively deterring and pushing back Soviet expansion. Presently, the Russian invasion of
Ukraine provoked a similar response from Washington. Aid to Ukraine increased drastically from $2.8 billion during 2014-2021, to $18.3 billion this year alone, despite similar unfavorable economic and social conditions. Both policy changes occurred in the context of difficult global and economic realities, but as history reveals, the U.S.’ interests abroad remain constant regardless of other variables. In Europe, this revolves around economic and political stability, and the propagation of American influence, which both the Soviets, and now Russia challenge. Despite Russia’s ailing strength, it still threatens U.S. interests in Europe, by way of its natural resources, military, and influence. Therefore, despite said realities and a growing focus on China, the U.S. finds itself committing heavily to Europe, once again.
The end of the Cold War introduced a shift in U.S. foreign policy towards upkeeping the world order through diplomacy. A new Russia emerged in the place of the old U.S.S.R., which appeared to align itself with this world order. The U.S. encouraged Russian integration into the international community, both through political, and economic integration, wishing to avoid the costs of yet another Cold War, and benefitting from newfound access to Russian markets. However, Russia never fully accepted post-Cold War realities, and America did not see the need to treat a fledgling, struggling Russia as an equal superpower, as it had been pre-1991. Having recovered from the 90s, Russia, once again, actively challenged U.S. interests, in Europe, the Middle East, and on the Home Front, forcing the U.S. to supplement the carrot for the stick in 2014. The U.S.’ diplomatic approach had failed to defuse the root cause for Russia challenging the world order: its dissatisfaction with losses suffered during the Cold War, particularly over Eastern Europe. America stood to lose far more by conceding its influence over Eastern Europe; stability in the region, and American influence could not easily be attained in direct competition with Russia.
The U.S.’ interests and status as the sole superpower inevitably lead to a collision with other Great Powers. The severity of said collision dictates whether passive, or active deterrence is utilized, and in the case of revisionist powers, history indicates that active deterrence is employed when diplomacy fails to resolve long-standing problems.
To conclude, this article has explored the U.S.’ present shift to a policy of Great Power confrontation, by examining similar such events in the past. Exploring politics through history permits for a greater understanding of the U.S.’ current situational analysis, and priorities, and frames matters into context. History suggests that, the U.S. will continue to remain able and ready to actively deter Great Powers, should it need to defend its global interests and standing as a superpower.
References
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on August 17, 2022.’ August 17, 2022. National WWII Museum. ‘GIs in Germany: First Impressions of the Former Third Reich.’ May 16, 2020. The White House. ‘On-the-Record Press Call by Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant to the President and Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific.’ August 12, 2022. The World Bank. ‘Military expenditure (current USD) - United States.’ Accessed November 14, 2022.
U.S. Department of State Archives. ‘United States Relations with Russia: After the Cold War.’ Accessed November 14, 2022.
U.S. Department of State. ‘Advancing U.S. Engagement and Countering China in the Indo-Pacific and Beyond.’ September 17, 2020.
This article was initially submitted as an essay to University College London.
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